

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Strategic Targeting and the War on Terror

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper outlines a way to synchronize ends, ways and means in support of the global war on terror and proposes an organizational modification that can focus the interagency effort through a structured process of intelligence collection followed by a precise targeting methodology that produces the required effects by attacking the threat centers of gravity. It proposes the creation of a strategic level interagency targeting board, on equal footing with and inclusive of the National Security Council (NSC), which is solely responsible for prosecuting the strategic planning and execution of the war on terror.

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STRATEGIC TARGETING AND THE WAR ON TERROR

The United States and her allies are now involved in a new kind of war. This is a war that demands new approaches and new interagency relationships. The U.S. government must establish new procedures for achieving desired outcomes through a synergistic and coordinated approach that allows for the full application of all available capabilities. These procedures must dismantle the bureaucratic fragmentation, stovepiped systems, and the lack of communication that characterizes the current national security structure. It must leverage the capabilities of our allies while synchronizing all elements of U.S. national power with the goal of achieving decisive effects that disrupt and ultimately destroy the efforts of a worldwide terrorist network. In order to achieve these results, a new system of strategic targeting must be developed and sustained. This paper outlines a way to synchronize ends, ways and means in support of the global war on terror and proposes an organizational modification that can focus the interagency effort through a structured process of intelligence collection followed by a precise targeting methodology that produces the required effects by attacking the threat centers of gravity. It proposes the creation of a strategic level interagency targeting board, on equal footing with and inclusive of the National Security Council (NSC), which is solely responsible for prosecuting the strategic planning and execution of the war on terror.

IDENTIFYING THE THREAT

The global war on terror is unlike any that has been undertaken thus far in our history. Our enemies are not nations with large armies and significant industrial capabilities as we have faced before. Terrorists threaten us with small numbers of unconnected cells who use low technology methods to inflict great destruction and suffering for less cost than the price of a single precision munition. Unlike known terrorist cells of the past, evidence increasingly points to 'super-cells' that have the authority, means, and intent to execute operations without direction from a controlling element.¹ They do not subscribe to military tactics, but instead launch surprise attacks against civilian targets with the intent of inflicting massive casualties. Except for a single day in 1941, no enemy has ever attacked targets on U.S. soil in almost 140 years, but this enemy wages his war both inside our country and against our interests worldwide. Their attacks can cripple our economy and divert enormous resources from important domestic issues. This enemy can choose the time, location and method of his attack, using multiple weapons types and techniques. The very freedom and openness that makes America the world's strongest democracy also allows the terrorist to easily penetrate our borders and hide within our society – our vulnerabilities are his strengths. They have the advantage of monitoring international media

in order to determine how much our government agencies know about their activities and what measures are being taken to preempt or prevent his attack. Another disturbing aspect of this new threat is the terrorist's reliance on suicide attacks. Time and again, these new terrorists have adopted this tactic – where the attacker seeks death and considers it a requirement for successful mission accomplishment – as a method that is nearly impossible to prevent and virtually guarantees large numbers of casualties. These types of attacks, when coupled with the potential to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threaten an open society like ours in unprecedented ways.

These terrorist organizations have access to huge numbers of potential recruits and use religion and Anti-American sentiments to attract new members and garner sympathy from wealthy contributors. U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, our super-power status, and our ignorance of Islamic culture enrage the Muslim world and add to the pool of potential terrorist recruits. If the free world is unable to eliminate this growing threat, we face destruction at a level never seen in history with most of the dead being innocent civilians along with major damage to key facilities and infrastructure.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the nation was galvanized by the idea of bringing the perpetrators to justice. President Bush's initial speech to the nation on 12 September 2001 identified the attacks as an act of war and identified the enemy as Osama bin Laden and his Al Queda organization.² In his speech to Congress on 20 September, the President expanded the target set to include terrorist organizations with global reach, organizations and regimes that provide support to Al Queda (the Taliban, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), and all governments that support the global network of terrorists.³ Later, in the National Security Strategy published in September 2002, the administration prioritized the effort in the war on terrorism as the disruption and destruction of terrorist organizations with global reach by attacking leadership, command, control and communications, material support and finances. The document also added to the target list state sponsors of terrorism that attempt to gain or use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Thus, the list included Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime⁴. As of October 2002, the State Department's list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations includes 35 separate groups that operate out of 62 different countries.⁵

None of the available descriptions of the threat, however, included a precise definition of 'terrorists with global reach' – apparently intended by President Bush to include those that are the highest threat to America and our allies. In fact, the House Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security found that practically every agency of the U.S. government with a

counterterrorism mission uses a different definition of terrorism.⁶ These definitions are all too general to serve usefully as policy guidance since one could readily argue that any terrorist group with access to a plane ticket could be included on the list – with Hamas, Hizbollah and Abu Sayad being the most obvious.

Under these conditions, the necessity of clearly defining the threat and prioritizing the target list is clear. In order to prosecute a long term, global campaign to eliminate these threats, we must clearly define the enemy and develop a flexible framework that allocates resources, defines responsibilities, and deconflicts efforts. Such a process already exists in current military doctrine and to be effective in the war on terror, it needs only to receive inputs from all interagency players and a structure that allows for the deconfliction and synchronization of all elements of national power.

PRIORITIZING THE THREAT

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently stated that: “It is not possible to defend at every time, in every place, and against every conceivable technique. Therefore, what we must do is take the battle to them. That’s why President Bush’s position about going after global terrorists all over the world, wherever they are, and going after countries that are serving as sanctuaries and havens for terrorists is “the” only way to deal with that problem”.⁷

It is impossible, unwise and unnecessary to address every one of these organizations simultaneously or in the same manner, especially considering that some have made no threats toward America. Our national intelligence assets, law enforcement agencies, and military forces are constrained by limited resources and the necessity to focus on the highest priority threats. Some of these terrorist groups have never exported attacks beyond their own home countries and therefore offer no immediate threat to the U.S. homeland. Still others can be deterred through focused information operations, economic incentives, or humanitarian aid, alleviating the requirement for more direct countermeasures or preemptive action.

Our strategic leaders clearly understand that this is a new kind of war – one that will require new strategies and new tactics. President Bush stated that Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have seen. He also described how the nation must “direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network”.⁸ Our leaders have clearly established *what* must be done. Now, the key question is *how* it can

be accomplished. The answer to this leads to the knowledge of how our current national security system must be modified to accomplish our objectives.

FOCUSING THE EFFORT

The Congressional investigation finalized in October 2002 that studied the interagency process and intelligence sharing prior to the 9/11 attacks highlights serious shortfalls in current procedures. It suggests that all information necessary to prevent the attacks was probably available, but because the intelligence providing the indications and warning of an impending attack resided in multiple organizations and in multiple layers within those organizations, it could not be consolidated and analyzed in its entirety.⁹ Senator Fred Thompson pointed out that the government agencies are so tangled in bureaucracy that they are dysfunctional.¹⁰ Congressman Bereuter of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence states: "I have been amazed thus far to find that there seems to have been not one place in the federal government where there was a responsibility for examining all the potential terrorist scenarios, and then taking plans to avoid them..."¹¹ Mr. Wolfowitz solidifies the argument for change in his statement that: "Old stove pipes are being and must be broken down. The culture of compartmentation is to be reconsidered and must be reconsidered.... A culture of excessive compartmentation will hinder our ability to defeat new threats. We need to facilitate greater sharing of information and collaboration with and between intelligence agencies, including law enforcement agencies and analysts and collectors.... It means we have to work together between the executive and legislative branches, within the executive branch, with foreign intelligence services to redefine relationships and rules."¹² These statements and findings further highlight the urgent need for a disciplined process to aid in interagency coordination and intelligence sharing. More alarmingly, these discussions do not even address our capability for and the necessity of intelligence sharing with our coalition allies.

Key to this effort is to attack the terrorist's ideology – and the source of their manpower – the millions of Muslims who are vulnerable to exploitation by radical fundamentalists. Dr. Stephen Biddle argues that this huge pool of politically uncommitted Muslims is, in fact, the terrorist's strategic center of gravity. He highlights that the terrorist's ideology is the real threat and the only way to defeat it is to win a 'war of ideas' that separates the terrorists from their source of new recruits.¹³ This cannot be done through a military campaign divorced from diplomacy and informational efforts.

POLICY ISSUES

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that “wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national power: economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and both overt and covert military operations.”¹⁴ How these elements are to be focused and tasked to maximize the synergistic effect of both U.S. and allied capabilities is a huge strategic policy issue. As highlighted above, there is currently no process to do this with respect to the global war on terror.

The almost universal agreement that the acts of 9/11 constituted an act of war and that the U.S. and our allies are currently in a state of war against a global network of terrorists demands a change in our historical treatment of terrorism. Presidential Decision Directive 39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (classified) assigns the Department of Justice, through the FBI, as the lead agency responsible for crisis response in the event of terrorist attack. This policy is focused on deterrence and response and not on preemption. It recognizes the reality that pre 9/11 terrorist activity was primarily a law enforcement mission and clearly focuses on the efforts of agencies within the Department of Justice to obtain the necessary evidence to prosecute the terrorists in a court of law. Executive Order Number 12,333, signed by President Ronald Reagan, directs that “no person employed by or acting on behalf of the U.S. government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination”. This policy has not been officially changed.¹⁵ It is certainly well known to the terrorists and they can use it to their advantage.

If a state a war against these entities is a reality, then the perpetrators of terrorist acts are not criminals, but they are combatants in that war. According to U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, “Combatants are liable to attack if they are participating in hostilities, providing logistics, communications, administrative, or other support; or participating as staff planners. An individual combatant’s vulnerability to lawful targeting is not dependent on his military duties or proximity to combat.”¹⁶ There are also multiple examples of the United States using military force to protect its citizens when other nations have failed to do so. The case most applicable to the current situation is Operation Eldorado Canyon, where U.S. military forces attacked terrorist training camps and infrastructure in Libya in 1986. The point of this argument is that the inherent right to self defense to protect both the nation and individual citizens supports unilateral action against an immediate threat and demands that terrorists are subject to attack wherever they are found. Even though this battlefield is global in nature, the U.S. government should pursue terrorists as true combatants and not merely as ‘suspected criminals’ until proven guilty in court. Our operators must be empowered to engage terrorists with deadly force whenever and wherever they are found – without restrictions by rules of

evidence and due process. Applied to the conventional battlefield, these restrictions would completely hamstring operations at every level and would present unacceptable risk to our own forces. Legal arguments concerning the status of Al Qaeda and Taliban members in detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba highlight this key policy issue. At its heart is whether terrorists can and should be regarded as combatants and therefore subject to targeting with military force.

The recent CIA operation in Yemen, where a Hellfire missile fired from a UAV killed a high level Al Qaeda operative, indicates that our senior leaders understand the requirement to treat terrorists as combatants.¹⁷ It seems that U.S. government policy now reflects this new reality and our leaders are prepared to address the issues of international law necessary to continue to engage terrorists with covert action. These new tactics present further policy challenges to address the operational methods and authorities of covert action teams tasked with counterterrorist missions. Alexander Calahan uncovers some of these issues in his research into the Israeli response to the attack on their athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Of several teams dispatched by Prime Minister Golda Meir to find and kill the responsible individuals, only one achieved any major success. This team succeeded in terminating eight of the eleven original terrorists involved as well as another who replaced an original leader in the organization. This team's success has been attributed to its superb intelligence network, cohesive teamwork, and most importantly to the fact that it operated for over two years with almost total autonomy from the Israeli government. Other teams that were closely supervised at high levels in their government, poorly organized, and who lacked sufficient intelligence sources were not only unsuccessful, but they were embarrassing failures. The worst example is a team that killed the wrong man in Lillehammer, Norway. Five of the team members were eventually convicted of murder and the Israeli government was positively linked to the operation.¹⁸ The U.S. government can learn a great deal from studying past operations of this nature to avoid similar mistakes.

Another key objective of the Israeli covert operations was to "create terror within the terrorist's organization".¹⁹ This idea – to defeat terrorist by sowing constant fear and anxiety – seems to be taking hold in an ever-widening circle of policy advisors. Retired Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak recently told an 'Inside the Pentagon' reporter that we must use deception and psychological operations to bring confusion into their organizations and, above all, we should make their days and nights ones of terror. They should slowly but surely meet death: on a road or trail, around a campfire, in the peace and comfort of their homes and in every place that they might feel secure....There should be no sanctuary, no place where they feel safe."²⁰

Because it is impossible to secure perfect intelligence and therefore be aware of every potential terrorist act, it is also impossible to prevent them all in a strategic defensive posture. Additionally, history has proven that individual terrorist acts cannot be deterred through an isolated military response – especially not by offensive action that occurs *after* the terrorists have completed their attack. In fact, this sort of response could arguably embolden terrorists to attempt more dramatic and devastating attacks by highlighting our inability to prevent them. This reality is likely the source of this administration's newly articulated preemptive strike policy in the latest National Security Strategy.²¹

These methods and options for response involve sensitive policy issues that must be clearly defined. They will require discipline and very careful coordination to apply a high level of constant pressure over long periods of time to be effective.

INTELLIGENCE IS INDESPENSIBLE

A basic military premise is that intelligence drives operations and that the commander must focus the intelligence collection effort to support his strategy.²² Focus is certainly an issue in the current war. In order to prioritize and synchronize the combined actions of all organizations contributing to this enormous undertaking, the Commander in Chief and his National Security Advisor must establish priority information requirements to guide the collection planning of all intelligence agencies and drive the overall effort. These information requirements will necessarily change over time and will require routine updates. Some possible requirements for the current phase of the war include:

- What terrorist elements present the highest threat to the United States and her allies?
- Where are these elements located and what are their current dispositions?
- What are the main vulnerabilities of these elements and where are their centers of gravity?
- Do these elements currently possess the means to attack our interests – our homeland, our facilities and personnel, and our national economy?
- What capabilities or installations are most at risk?
- Are these terrorist elements receiving external support from other regimes or entities? Who are they?

Armed with such a list of priority information requirements, the U.S. intelligence community and our allies could focus their collection efforts to answer these key questions. Our leaders would be equipped with the knowledge necessary to plan a strategy to address the threats in a focused priority. Once this information is available, planners could then follow a

structured targeting process and develop means to apply the appropriate element of national power to eliminate each threat. Properly analyzed intelligence will allow strategic planners to prioritize targets, deconflict future collection efforts, and synchronize the overall strategy. This focus will provide synergy and efficiency to the entire war effort and will almost certainly preserve finite resources and will likely shorten the war. Detailed nodal analysis of each of the known threat organizations would lead to more complete knowledge of potential weaknesses and the ability to deter or eliminate certain threats without resorting to offensive operations.

Yet, even with a clear focus on the collection requirements, our current system would be sorely challenged to deliver the analyzed intelligence picture necessary for precise targeting. Study after study confirms that the many existing intelligence arms of our government (24 at last count) - with the primaries being the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) - seldom share information and have no interconnected, secure computer networks or databases.²³ Without a structured process to align the vast intelligence capabilities of this nation and facilitate rapid information sharing, any effort to engage the terrorist network is sure to fall short.

INTEGRATING THE AGENCIES

A successful strategy for executing this war will require a level of interagency coordination and cooperation that has never before been achieved. The existing National Security Council (NSC) system, that served our nation well during the Cold War years, is not sufficient to effectively contribute to such a complex endeavor. Currently, the NSC is the only agency in the executive branch that is authorized to issue authoritative directives to all government agencies.²⁴ These directives have historically been so vague and open-ended that various agencies were able to interpret them freely and pursuant to their own independent and often conflicting policies.²⁵ The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century delivered a stinging critique of the current national security apparatus stating that there is "no overarching strategic framework that guides U.S. national security policymaking or resource allocation". This commission recommended a redesign of the system to permit our government to more effectively integrate the diverse elements of policy that are critical to U.S. national security and further defined strategic planning as "largely absent within the U.S. government". The study states that the strategic planning that does occur is ad hoc and that there is no overarching framework that guides national security policy or allocation of resources. Additionally, the study identified the lack of connectivity required to network all government agencies and facilitate

intelligence sharing. It recommended a national security affairs computer network similar to the Department of Defense's Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).²⁶

These findings are especially disturbing when one considers that there are no lead agencies in our government responsible for coordinating either the informational or economic elements of power. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's effort to establish an Office of Strategic Influence was quickly killed by both Congressional and public outrage – most likely because neither group understood the necessity of such an organization. Without a central clearing entity for information, our ability to execute effective strategic Information Operations – psychological operations (PSYOP), command and control (C2) and computer network protection and attack functions, deception, misinformation, and many others – will never be maximized. The executive branch has, however, made significant changes in the interagency process in an effort to organize national level information. The President recently directed the creation of a White House Office of Global Communications and also established a Policy Coordination Committees for Strategic Communications (State Department led) and another for Information Strategy (NSC-led).²⁷ Unfortunately, these steps do not solve the key issue: No member of the current national security structure has lead agent responsibility for this critical element of power.

As for economics, the authority to commit resources to allow for adjustments during ongoing operations and to engage in decisive action against threats seems to be spread across multiple agencies and organizations to include the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Economic Council, and even the United States Trade Representative. None of these entities is a statutory member of the NSC.

This situation is aggravated by cultural differences and turf battles between agencies, resource constraints, political agendas, and competing policies. As explained Dr. Morton Halperin, (a former Assistant Secretary of Defense) Presidential Decision Directives that flow from NSC recommendations vary widely in their specificity and often only outline intent or 'sentiment' without identifying the details of who should execute the policy, how it should be done, or how soon and to what standard it must be completed.²⁸ This allows for multiple agencies to pursue their own different agendas without fixing responsibility or establishing performance measures. A system that allows agencies to freely interpret their requirements without strictly defined standards for execution and procedures for interagency coordination, progress reviews, and final assessment of effectiveness leads to a myriad of problems. These

include competing priorities, apathy, insufficient means or resources, overlapping efforts, inefficiency, and ultimately failure to achieve the desired results.

In the current war against terrorism, strategic policy guidance must address the ends, ways and means of each specific action by following a structured process that addresses operational objectives and strategic outcomes. Guidance must be personally driven by the Commander in Chief with coordination authority delegated to the National Security Advisor and the NSC. This process must deconflict the efforts of disparate agencies to maximize efficiency and provide for periodic assessments of how effective each action has been in achieving the desired effects.

To properly harness the capabilities of every national agency and all the elements of national power – not to mention maximizing the potential of our allies - requires reorganization of our government structures that allows for centralized planning and oversight. The current administration has taken multiple steps in this direction; including the establishment of an Department of Homeland Security, the creation of Northern Command, new rules for intelligence sharing between agencies, the addition of a Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism, and proposals to create an Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and to merge U.S. Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service into a single agency.²⁹ These efforts are certainly helpful, but they fail to address the primary weakness in the current system: No single organization is currently responsible for synchronizing all elements of national power along with the efforts of our allies; or for determining priorities and seeking decisions for taskings. Most importantly, these initiatives only address methods for dealing with threats inside the borders of the United States and do nothing to improve our capabilities for offensive action against terrorists worldwide.

As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated in recent congressional testimony: “The clear deficiency before [9/11] is that we didn’t have anyone with the responsibility for dealing precisely with that problem [terrorism]”.³⁰ As stated above, The NSC has attempted to fulfill this requirement, but its recommendations have historically been policy related and have seldom resulted in specific decisions that lead to executable orders or taskings.³¹ The NCS was activated as a part of the National Security Act of 1947 with the intent of creating a high level advisory panel to keep the President up to date on domestic, foreign and military policies and to assist in coordinating the activities of national security agencies and departments. It has since evolved into something that more closely resembles a distinct government agency - including it’s own press, legislative, and informational entities and it has assumed the country’s central policymaking and operational role.³² Unfortunately, the facts

clearly show that the NSC has failed to adjust to the changing trends in economics, technology advances, global political complexities and military challenges that characterize the current global order and that also represent major changes in the national security environment. Specifically, the NSC has failed to precisely coordinate the many activities of the government bureaucracy to advance unity of effort and synergy.

UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT

A close look at the new security environment reveals several key points:

- The war on terror is unlike any in our history and we therefore have limited experience in understanding how to prosecute it.
- A war that is so fundamentally different in terms of threat, risk and resources required may also drive changes in our old ways of warfighting, especially considering the level of interagency coordination and cooperation required.
- Winning the war on terror requires not only aggressive action to destroy existing terrorist organizations, but (perhaps more importantly) it requires the containment or elimination of the radical Muslim ideology that is the source of terrorist operatives.
- The list of potential enemies is too large and the threats are too dispersed to permit simultaneous engagement.
- A strategy of preemption is necessary to prevent future devastation, but that strategy depends on actionable intelligence that provides indications and warning.
- Intelligence collection resources are finite and the effort must be focused on the highest threats. Collection assets and plans must be deconflicted to maximize efficiency and improve the quantity and quality of intelligence gathered.
- Analysis of collected information must lead to action. Action requires decisions on what element of national power should be brought to bear and which asset is best suited to address a particular threat.
- Authoritative instructions with the '5 Ws' from the highest level to every action agency are required and the focus of these directives should be on the effects that must be achieved.
- The war on terror requires a method to routinely measure effectiveness and oversee the implementation of the President's decisions.
- Resources available for responding to newly identified threats are finite, therefore critical decisions on priority, sequencing, and desired effects must be centralized at a high level.

- Our government currently has major challenges in synchronizing the effort due to bureaucratic stovepipes, interagency parochialisms, and an overall lack of structure to support strategic level targeting.

By establishing a high level interagency working group that is responsible for strategic targeting and that includes representation from all of elements of national power, our government can combine the effects of each discipline to address the highest level threat with the right asset at the right time. It can eliminate stovepipes and redundancy, facilitate information sharing, prioritize threats, resources, and activities, and measure the effectiveness of our strategy. This group could also coordinate the efforts of our allies and leverage their assets and capabilities. They must be required to meet regularly and follow a set agenda by providing updates on the critical information requirements and reviewing the prioritized target lists. The working group would then brief the President and NSC to receive guidance and confirm taskings that fix responsibility for each target set. They would allocate required resources for engagement, and assess the effects that are necessary for success. The result of these periodic briefings should be new instructions and course corrections to the current strategy that would then be translated into operational plans at subordinate levels.

This group would require membership from every element of national power based on the current NSC structure, but expanded to include the FBI, Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Departments of Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Energy, Transportation, key DoD agencies and any others required. Additionally, the group would require a senior advisor responsible for coordinating and employing America's informational element of power and another lead agent for advising on the employment of economic means.

A SYSTEM THAT WORKS

The process required for this effort very closely mirrors joint doctrine for fire support and the targeting cycle. This doctrine can be modified to fit the interagency environment. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account all requirements and capabilities available. It is a combination of intelligence functions, planning, execution, and assessment of effects. It includes the analysis of the threat to identify specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the overall aim of the commander.³³ In the context of the war on terror, the appropriate response to a terrorist threat might include any number of viable options including; information operations via international media, focused intelligence gathering, surveillance or reconnaissance, computer network attack, military strikes

or raids, psychological operations, diplomatic action, judicial action, seizure of assets/freezing of bank accounts, humanitarian operations and nation building to deprive terrorists of new recruits, and many others.

The current military targeting methodology of Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess (D3A) could be adopted as the key process to support this working group. D3A was first introduced by the U.S. Army Field Artillery community in 1972 and has been used with great success ever since³⁴. It is now the standard process for targeting threats during joint operations and serves to synchronize maneuver, intelligence, and fire support.³⁵ Only slight modifications would be necessary to adapt this highly developed methodology to strategic level targeting for the war on terror.

In the first step - decide – target categories are identified for engagement. The interagency targeting board would decide which threats are most dangerous, where they are, and how they can best be addressed to achieve the President's desired end state. In this phase, the group would also determine which assets/elements of national power are available and most appropriate for allocation to execute the engagement. The group would also identify the assets required to acquire the target and monitor its status throughout the entire engagement sequence.

The second step – detect - involves the steps necessary to acquire the target identified during step one. Intelligence agencies would be tasked to collect on the target and monitor designated areas of interest. Detection of the target – including the exact location and disposition – is an essential element of this step.

The third step is the delivery of the requisite asset to achieve the desired effect using the most effective option based on capabilities and availability of resources. This can include either lethal or non-lethal force. This step may also require refinement of the taskings based on new target data. The focus on the effects required to achieve the desired result is key. These effects must objectively contribute to the goal of punishing the enemy at multiple levels – whether tactical, operational or strategic – and result in disruption or destruction of his capabilities at one or more of these levels. The 'asset' could be anything from a military attack to a diplomatic warning.

Finally, in the last step, the working group would establish and employ the proper method to determine if the desired effect (destruction or a change in behavior using these examples) was achieved. This assessment requires thorough coordination between the executing agency and intelligence assets to determine if the desired outcome was realized. If

this has not been accomplished, the group might recommend that the target be engaged again and may also select a different asset as required.

This targeting group would have to continuously prioritize the targets to be engaged and assess the status of each target set, focusing on the center of gravity of each terrorist organization. The goal of this focus must be on those aspects of the enemy's strength that, if properly attacked, would quickly lead to the collapse of his capability to harm our interests.

The creation of a strategic interagency targeting board focused on combating terrorism is imperative and long overdue. This restructuring of our national security apparatus is relatively simple and low cost. The only requirement that involves significant effort is the creation of a national security affairs computer network that seamlessly connects all intelligence agencies and functions. This could be accomplished quickly by adopting the SIPRNET system of DoD to fulfill the initial requirement. The only substantial changes in existing government organizations is the requirement to identify and empower appropriate leaders who will be responsible for oversight and employment of the informational and economic elements of national power. These individuals would require a permanent seat on the National Security Council. That fact that they do not exist today is a serious shortcoming. Additionally, the President and/or National Security Advisor must direct the protocols, attendees, and agendas needed to structure periodic meetings. A final consideration is the determination of the most appropriate means to keep our allies properly informed and to influence them to assist whenever possible. The willingness and ability to share highly sensitive intelligence is a requirement that must be closely weighed, but one that is necessary to leverage all available resources.

As the war on terror progresses, this process will provide the focus necessary to allow for continuous assessments of progress in achieving the desired outcomes, and will allow our strategic leadership to measure the overall effectiveness of the effort. It will provide a means to constantly re-assess the most immediate threats and allow for preventive and/or preemptive action as necessary. It will allow us to maximize "every tool in our arsenal – military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing".³⁶ It will also provide the forum to determine how we can best assist our allies and harness their capabilities in this global endeavor.

The existing government structure and process for engaging these threats is clearly deficient. Our nation must change the interagency system to conform to the new realities of the changing global security environment. It is critical that we act quickly while we retain the initiative from our initial successes against Al Queda and the Taliban. These changes cannot be the result of a slow evolution, but rather a rapid and decisive reorganization that creates a

structure and a process that effectively integrates all elements of national power in an on-going campaign to defeat the global terrorist threat.

WORD COUNT =6,059

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